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Structure in the Value Function of Two-Player
Zero-Sum Games of Incomplete Information
Auke J. Wiggers1 and Frans A. Oliehoek2 and Diederik M. Roijers3
Abstract. Zero-sum stochastic games provide a rich model for
competitive decision making. However, under general forms of state
uncertainty as considered in the Partially Observable Stochastic
Game (POSG), such decision making problems are still not very
well understood. This paper makes a contribution to the theory of
zero-sum POSGs by characterizing structure in their value function.
In particular, we introduce a new formulation of the value func-
tion for zs-POSGs as a function of the ‘plan-time sufficient statis-
tics’ (roughly speaking the information distribution in the POSG),
which has the potential to enable generalization over such informa-
tion distributions. We further delineate this generalization capability
by proving a structural result on the shape of value function: it ex-
hibits concavity and convexity with respect to appropriately chosen
marginals of the statistic space. This result is a key pre-cursor for de-
veloping solution methods that may be able to exploit such structure.
Finally, we show how these results allow us to reduce a zs-POSG
to a ‘centralized’ model with shared observations, thereby transfer-
ring results for the latter, narrower class, to games with individual
(private) observations.
1 Introduction
Modeling decision making for strictly competitive settings with in-
complete information is a field with many promising applications for
AI. Examples include games such as poker [24] and security settings
[8]. In strictly competitive sequential games in which the environ-
ment can be influenced through actions, the problem of behaving ra-
tionally can be modeled as a zero-sum Partially Observable Stochas-
tic Game (zs-POSG).
Reasoning about zs-POSGs poses a challenge for strategic agents:
they need to reason about their own uncertainty regarding the state of
the environment as well as uncertainty regarding the opposing agent.
As this opponent is trying to minimize the reward that they are max-
imizing, behaving strategically typically requires stochastic strate-
gies. A factor that further complicates the reasoning is that agents
not only influence their immediate rewards, but also the future state
of the environment and both agents’ future observations.
In this paper, we prove the existence of structural properties of zs-
POSGs, that may be exploited to make reasoning about these models
more tractable. We take inspiration from recent work for collabora-
tive settings which has shown that it is possible to summarize the past
joint policy using so called plan-time sufficient statistics [15], which
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can be interpreted as the belief of a special type of Partially Observ-
able Markov Decision Process (POMDP) to which the collaborative
Decentralized POMDP can be reduced [3, 10, 14]. This enabled tack-
ling these problems using solution methods for POMDPs, leading to
increases in scalability [3].
This paper provides a theoretical basis for enabling similar ad-
vancements for zs-POSGs. In particular, we extend results for Dec-
POMDPs to the zs-POSG setting by presenting three contributions:
1. Two novel formulations of the value functions in POSGs, one
based on past joint policies, and one based on distributions of in-
formation in the game called plan-time sufficient statistics.
2. A proof that the latter formulation allows for a generalization over
the statistics: on every stage, the value function exhibits concavity
and convexity in different subspaces of statistic space.
3. A reduction of the zs-POSG to a Non-Observable Stochastic
Game, which in turn allows us to shows that certain properties
previously proven for narrower classes of games generalize to the
more general zs-POSG considered here.
This is the first work that gives insight in how the value function of a
zs-POSG generalizes over the space of sufficient statistics. We argue
that this result may open up the route for new solution methods.
2 Background
In this section we provide the necessary background to explain our
contributions. We defer a treatment of related work to Section 6,
where we can more concisely point out the differences to our work.
This paper focuses on zero-sum games of incomplete information
where the number of states, actions, observations and the horizon are
finite. We examine games where the hidden state is static, and games
with dynamic state (i.e., it changes over time). We assume perfect
recall, i.e., agents recall their own past actions and observations, and
assume that all elements of the game are common knowledge among
the agents [19, Chapter 5].
2.1 Zero-Sum One-Shot Games
We start by describing one-shot (static) games.
Definition 1. A normal form game (NFG) is a tuple N =
〈I,A,R〉:
• I = {1, 2} is the set of 2 agents,
• A = A1 ×A2 is the set of joint actions a = 〈a1, a2〉, also called
(joint) strategies,
• R = {R1, R2} is the set of reward (or ‘payoff’) functions for the
agents: Ri : A→ R is the reward function for agent i,
In the case of a zero-sum NFG (zs-NFG), we have that R1(a) =
−R2(a),∀a. In a zs-NFG, we will define the following quantities
(and the associated strategies):
Definition 2. The maxmin value (for agent 1) of a 2 player zero-
sum game is defined as Vmaxmin(N ) = maxa1 mina2 R1(a1, a2).
Definition 3. The minmax value (for agent 1) of a 2 player zero-
sum game is defined as Vminmax(N ) = mina2 maxa1 R1(a1, a2).
The min-max theorem states that ∀N Vmaxmin(N ) ≤
Vminmax(N ) [2]. In case of equality, we say that V (N ) =
Vmaxmin(N ) = Vminmax(N ) is the value of the game.
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a joint strategy from which no agent
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. In zs-NFGs, if an NE exists,
then it coincides with the value of the game. That is, the value of a
game is the value attained when both agents follow the strategy spec-
ified by the NE. Moreover any NEs, also called saddle points in this
context, correspond to maxmin-strategies for the players [19, Propo-
sition 22.2]. We will refer to such strategies as rational strategies.
The value is not guaranteed to exist in all zs-NFGs. If the action
sets are convex and compact, if ∀a2, the mapping a1 → R1(a1, a2)
is a concave function, and if ∀a1, a2 → R1(a1, a2) is a convex
function, then the value exists and the zs-NFG has a Nash equi-
librium (i.e., a saddle point) [1, p. 134], [19, Proposition 20.3]. In
games where actions are discrete, an NE (and corresponding value)
may not exist. However, when mixed strategies are allowed, we
can convert to a continuous action NFG: 〈I,M1 ×M2,R′〉, where
µi ∈ Mi specifies a probability distribution over actions, and where
R′i(µ1, µ2) =
∑
a1
µ1(a1)
∑
a2
µ2(a2)Ri(a1, a2). Furthermore, it
can now be shown that the utility function R′(µ1, µ2) in terms of
mixed strategies is concave in µ1 for each µ2, and convex in µ2 for
each µ1, such that the aforementioned assumptions needed for the
existence of a saddle-point hold (i.e., an NE exists [2, p.239]).
2.2 Zero-Sum Bayesian Games
Here we consider zero-sum Bayesian Games (zs-BGs), in which
agents simultaneously select an action based on an individual ob-
servation (often referred to as their type).
Definition 4. A zs-BG is defined as a tuple B = 〈I,Θ,A, R, σ〉:
• I = {1, 2} is the set of 2 agents,
• Θ = Θ1 ×Θ2 is the finite set of joint types θ = 〈θ1, θ2〉,
• A = A1 ×A2 is the finite set of joint actions a = 〈a1, a2〉,
• R : Θ×A → R is the reward function for agent 1,
• σ ∈ ∆(Θ) is the probability distribution over joint types.
In this paper we treat finite zs-BGs, where the sets of actions and
types are finite. A pure strategy, to which we refer as a pure deci-
sion rule, is a mapping from types to actions. A stochastic decision
rule δi ∈ ∆Si is a mapping from types to probability distributions
over the set of actions, denoted as δi(ai|θi), ∆Si is the space of such
mappings. Given a joint decision rule δ = 〈δ1, δ2〉, the value is:
QBG(B, δ) ,
∑
θ
σ(θ)
∑
a
δ(a|θ)R(θ, a). (1)
where δ(a|θ) , δ1(a1|θ1)δ2(a2|θ2). The case of pure decision rules
is covered by treating them as degenerate stochastic policies.
There are two ways to reduce a zs-BG to a zs-NFG. First, we can
simply reinterpret QBG(B, δ) as a payoff function R(δ1, δ2), such
that the BG corresponds to an NFG with continuous action sets ∆Si
for each player i. The conditions for the existence of the value for
such a game can be shown to hold, so if we suppose that 〈δ∗1 , δ∗2〉
is an NE, then the value of the game can be defined as the maxmin
(=minmax) value:
VBG(B) , QBG(B, 〈δ
∗
1 , δ
∗
2〉) =
max
δ1∈∆
S
1
min
δ2∈∆
S
2
QBG(B, 〈δ1, δ2〉) = min
δ2∈∆
S
2
max
δ1∈∆
S
1
QBG(B, 〈δ1, δ2〉). (2)
Alternatively, one can reinterpret the BG as an NFG with finite
action sets corresponding to the pure decision rules. This then leads
to a similar R′(µ1, µ2) formulation where the mixed strategies µi
now are distributions over pure decision rules. Again this formulation
will satisfy the required assumptions on concavity/convexity, such
that this reinterpretation leads to the same logical conclusion that the
value of the finite zs-BG exists (these dual perspectives are possible
due to the one-one correspondence between stochastic decision rules
and mixed strategies).
These reductions imply that solution methods for zs-NFGs (e.g.,
via linear programming [25]) can be used to solve zs-BGs. However,
such an approach does not scale well — a more efficient solution
method is to convert the zs-BG to sequence form [9].
2.3 Zero-sum POSGs
A zero-sum Partially Observable Stochastic Game (zs-POSG) is a
model for multi-agent decision making under uncertainty in zero-
sum sequential games where the state changes over time, and the
agents simultaneously choose actions at every stage.
Definition 5. A finite zs-POSG is defined as a tuple P =
〈h, I,S ,A,O, T, O,R, b0〉:
• h is the horizon,
• I = {1, 2} is the set of 2 agents,
• S is the finite set of states s,
• A = A1 ×A2 is the finite set of joint actions a = 〈a1, a2〉,
• O = O1 ×O2 is the finite set of joint observations o = 〈o1, o2〉,
• T is the transition function Pr(st+1|st, at),
• O is the observation function Pr(ot+1|st+1, at),
• R : S ×A× S → R is the reward function for agent 1,
• b0 ∈ ∆(S) is the probability distribution over states.
In the zs-POSG, we aim to find maxmin-strategies and cor-
responding value. Let a pure policy for agent i be a map-
ping from individual action-observation histories (AOHs) ~θti =
〈a0i , o
1
i , . . . , a
t−1
i , o
t
i〉 to actions. Let a stochastic policy for agent
i be a mapping from individual AOHs to a probability distribution
over actions, denoted as πi(ati|~θti). An individual policy defines ac-
tion selection of one agent on every stage of the game, and is essen-
tially a sequence of individual decision rules πi = 〈δ0i . . . δh−1i 〉. We
define the past individual policy as a tuple of decision rules ϕti =
〈δ0i , . . . , δ
t−1
i 〉, and define the tuple containing decision rules from
stage t to h as the partial individual policy πti = 〈δti , . . . , δh−1i 〉.
As in zs-BGs, it is theoretically possible to convert a zs-POSG to
a zs-NFG and solve using standard methods, but this is infeasible in
practice. An alternative is to converting the zs-POSG to an extensive
form game (EFG) and solve it in sequence form [9]. While this is
more efficient than the NFG route, it is still intractable: the resulting
EFG is huge since its size depends on the number of full histories
(trajectories of joint actions, joint observations, and states) [18].
With the goal of opening paths to completely new approaches of
tackling zs-POSGs, this paper focuses on the description of the value
function of zs-POSGs, which (in contrast to the value of a game as
defined above) is a function mapping from some notion of ‘state’ of
a game to the expected value (for agent 1). Similar to how the ‘value’
is defined by rational strategies, we will use the term ‘value function’
for a function that captures the future expected rewards under a ratio-
nal joint policy. However, since one can also reason about the value
of non-rational policies, we will refer to the ‘rational value function’
if there is a need to clarify.
3 Structure in One-Shot Value
In order to provide a value function definition for the sequential set-
ting (in Section 4), we will rely on an intermediate result for one-shot
games developed in this section. In particular, we introduce the con-
cept of a Family of zero-sum Bayesian Games, for which we will
introduce the joint type distribution as a suitable notion of ‘state’ and
prove that its value function exhibits certain concave/convex proper-
ties with respect to this notion.
3.1 Families of Bayesian Games
Here we consider the notion of a family of (zs)-BGs. Intuitively, dif-
ferent stages t of a POSG are similar to a BG: each agent has a pri-
vately observed history, which corresponds to its type. However, the
probabilities of these histories might depend on how the game was
played in earlier stages. As such, we will need to reason about fami-
lies of BGs.
Definition 6. A Family of Bayesian Games, F = 〈I,Θ,A, R〉,
is the set of Bayesian Games of the form 〈I,Θ,A, R, σ〉 for which
I,Θ,A and R are identical.
LetF be a Family of zero-sum Bayesian Games. By providing a joint
type distribution, F(σ) indicates a particular zs-BG. We generalize
(1) and (2) as follows:
QF (σ, δ) , QBG(F(σ), δ), (3)
V
∗
F(σ) , VBG(F(σ)). (4)
As each F(σ) is a zs-BG, the rational value function V ∗F(σ) can be
written as:
V
∗
F (σ) = max
δ1∈∆
S
1
min
δ2∈∆
S
2
QF(σ, 〈δ1, δ2〉). (5)
We define best-response value functions that give the best-response
value to a decision rule of the opposing agent:
V
BR1
F (σ, δ2) , max
δ1∈∆
S
1
QF (σ, 〈δ1, δ2〉), (6)
V
BR2
F (σ, δ1) , min
δ2∈∆
S
2
QF (σ, 〈δ1, δ2〉). (7)
We remind the reader that, for each σ, QF(σ, 〈δ1, δ2〉) exhibits con-
cavity and convexity in the space of decision rules, as discussed in
Section 2.2.
3.2 Concavity/Convexity of the Value Function
We saw in the previous section that the concave/convex shape of the
utility function expressed in the space of decision rules follows di-
rectly from known results. Here we provide a novel result: V ∗F ex-
hibits a similar concave/convex shape in terms of type distributions.
This is important, as it provides insight on how the distribution of in-
formation (in addition to the distribution of actions) affects the value
of the game, which is key to enabling generalization of the value in
different parts of sequential games. To provide this formulation, we
decompose σ into a marginal term σm,i and a conditional term σc,i,
here shown for i = 1:
σm,1(θ1) ,
∑
θ2∈Θ2
σ(θ1θ2), σc,1(θ2|θ1) ,
σ(θ1θ2)
σm,1(θ1)
. (8)
The terms σm,2 and σc,2 are defined similarly. We refer to the
simplex ∆(Θi) containing marginals σm,i as the marginal-space of
agent i. We write σt = σtm,iσtc,i for short.
We will first show that the best-response value functions defined in
(6) and (7) are linear in their respective marginal-spaces. Using this
result, we prove that V ∗F exhibits concavity in ∆(Θ1) for every σc,1,
and convexity in∆(Θ2) for every σc,2. For this purpose, let us define
a vector that contains the reward for agent 1 for each individual type
θ1, given σc,1 and given that agent 2 follows decision rule δ2:
~r[σc,1,δ2](θ1) , max
a1∈A1
[∑
θ2
σc,1(θ2|θ1)
∑
a2
δ2(a2|θ2)R(θ, a)
]
. (9)
The vector ~r[σc,2,δ1] is defined analogously.
Now we can state an important lemma that shows that the best-
response value functions are linear functions in the marginal space.
Lemma 1. (1) V BR1F is linear in ∆(Θ1) for all σc,1 and δ2, and (2)
V BR2F is linear in ∆(Θ2) for all σc,2 and δ1:
1. V BR1F (σm,1σc,1, δ2) = ~σm,1 · ~r[σc,1,δ2], (10)
2. V BR2F (σm,2σc,2, δ1) = ~σm,2 · ~r[σc,2,δ1]. (11)
Proof. The proof is listed in Appendix A.
This lemma can now be used to show that the rational value func-
tion V ∗F possess concave and convex structure with respect to (appro-
priately chosen marginals of) the space of joint type distributions.
Theorem 1. V ∗F is (1) concave in ∆(Θ1) for a given conditional
distribution σc,1, and (2) convex in ∆(Θ2) for a given conditional
distribution σc,2. More specifically, V ∗F is respectively a minimiza-
tion over linear functions in ∆(Θ1) and a maximization over linear
functions in ∆(Θ2):
1. V ∗F (σm,1σc,1) = min
δ2∈∆
S
2
[
~σm,1 · ~r[σc,1,δ2]
]
,
2. V ∗F (σm,2σc,2) = max
δ1∈∆
S
1
[
~σm,2 · ~r[σc,2,δ1]
]
.
Proof. Filling in the result of Lemma 1 gives:
V
∗
F (σm,1σc,1)
{5,6}
= min
δ2∈∆
S
2
V
BR1
F (σm,1σc,1, δ2)
{10}
= min
δ2∈∆
S
2
[
~σm,1 · ~r[σc,1,δ2]
]
.
The proof for item 2 is analogous to that of item 1.
The importance of this theorem is that it gives direct ways to ap-
proximately generalize the value function using piecewise-linear and
convex (concave) functions.
4 Structure in zs-POSG Value
Given the result for one-shot games established in the previous sec-
tion, we are now in the position to present our main contributions:
novel formulations for the value function, and generalization of the
structural result of Theorem 1 to the sequential setting. First, we will
introduce a description of the rational value function based on past
joint policies.
4.1 Past Joint Policies
To make rational decisions at stage t in the zs-POSG, it is sufficient
to know the past decisions, which are captured in the past joint pol-
icy ϕt. To show this, the zs-POSG value function in terms of the
past joint policy ϕt can be defined in terms of ϕt by extending the
formulation by Oliehoek [15].
We define the value function of the zs-POSG at a stage t in terms
of a past joint policy ϕt. The definition that follows gives the value
attained when all agents follow the joint decision rule δt, assuming
that in future stages agents will act rationally. That is, the agents
follow a rational joint future policy πt+1∗i = 〈δt+1∗ . . . δh−1∗〉.
We first define the Q-value function at the final stage t = h − 1,
and give an inductive definition of the Q-value function at preceding
stages. We then define the value function at every stage. Let immedi-
ate reward for a joint AOH and a joint decision rule be defined as:
R(~θt, δt) ,
∑
at
δ
t(at|~θt)
∑
st
Pr(st|~θt, b0)R(st, at).
For the final stage t = h − 1, the Q-value function reduces to this
immediate reward, as there is no future value:
Q
∗
h−1(ϕ
h−1
, ~θ
h−1
, δ
h−1) , R(~θh−1, δh−1). (12)
Given an AOH and decision rule at stage t, it is possible to find a
probability distribution over joint AOHs at the next stage, as a joint
AOH at t+ 1 is the joint AOH at t concatenated with joint action at
and joint observation ot+1:
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, δt)=Pr(〈~θt, at, ot+1〉|~θt, δt)=Pr(ot+1|~θt, at)δt(at|~θt).
For all stages except the final stage t = h − 1, the value at future
stages is propagated to the current stage as follows:
Q
∗
t (ϕ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t) , R(~θt, δt) +
∑
at∈A
∑
ot+1
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, δt)
Q
∗
t+1(ϕ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, δ
t+1∗). (13)
Q
∗
t (ϕ
t
, δ
t) ,
∑
~θt∈~Θt
Pr(~θt|b0, ϕt)Q∗t (ϕt, ~θt, δt). (14)
We use (14) to find rational decision rules for both agents. Consistent
with (13), we show how to find δt+1∗ = 〈δt+1∗1 , δt+1∗2 〉:
δ
t+1∗
1 = argmax
δ
t+1
1
∈∆S
1
min
δ
t+1
2
∈∆S
2
Q
∗
t+1(ϕ
t+1
, 〈δt+11 , δ
t+1
2 〉), (15)
δ
t+1∗
2 = argmin
δ
t+1
2
∈∆S
2
max
δ
t+1
1
∈∆S
1
Q
∗
t+1(ϕ
t+1
, 〈δt+11 , δ
t+1
2 〉). (16)
Using (12), (15) and (16), a rational joint decision rule δh−1∗ can
be found by performing a maxminimization over immediate reward.
Evaluation of Q∗h−1(ϕt, δh−1∗) gives us the value at stage t = h −
1, and (13) propagates the value to the preceding stages. As such,
rationality for all stages follows by induction. The value function can
now be defined in terms of the past joint policy as:
V
∗
t (ϕ
t) = max
δt
1
∈∆S
1
min
δt
2
∈∆S
2
Q
∗
t (ϕ
t
, 〈δt1, δ
t
2〉). (17)
By (12), (15) and (16), δt∗ is dependent on δt+1∗, and thus on the
rational future joint policy. However, δt+1∗ can only be found if past
joint policy ϕt+1, which includes δt, is known. As such, (17) can not
be used to form a backward inductive approach directly.
4.2 Plan-Time Sufficient Statistics
A disadvantage of the value function definition from the previous
section is that the value at a stage t depends on all the joint decisions
from stage 0 to t. We propose to define the value function in terms
of a plan-time sufficient statistic that summarizes many past joint
policies. Furthermore, we give formal proof that this value function
exhibits a concave/convex shape in statistic-space that may be ex-
ploitable.
Definition 7. The plan-time sufficient statistic for a general past
joint policy ϕt, assuming b0 is known, is a distribution over joint
AOHs: σt(~θt) , Pr(~θt|b0, ϕt).
In the collaborative Dec-POMDP case, a plan-time sufficient
statistic fully captures the influence of the past joint policy. We prove
that this also holds for the zs-POSG case, thereby validating the pre-
vious definition and the name ‘sufficient statistic‘. We aim to express
the value for a given decision rule δt in terms of a plan-time suffi-
cient statistic, given that the agents act rationally at later stages. First,
we define the update rule for plan-time sufficient statistics:
σ
t+1(~θt+1) , Pr(ot+1|~θt, at)δt(at|~θt)σt(~θt). (18)
The Q-value function at stage h−1 reduces to the immediate reward:
Q
∗
h−1(σ
h−1
, ~θ
h−1
, δ
h−1) , R(~θh−1, δh−1). (19)
We then define the Q-value for all other stages similar to (13), (14):
Q
∗
t (σ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t) , R(~θt, δt) +
∑
at
∑
ot+1
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, δt)
Q
∗
t+1(σ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, δ
t+1∗). (20)
Q
∗
t (σ
t
, δ
t) ,
∑
~θt
σ
t(~θt)Q∗t (σ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t). (21)
Rational decision rules can be found using (21):
δ
t+1∗
1 = argmax
δ
t+1
1
∈∆S
1
min
δ
t+1
2
∈∆S
2
Q
∗
t+1(σ
t+1
, 〈δt+11 , δ
t+1
2 〉), (22)
δ
t+1∗
2 = argmin
δ
t+1
2
∈∆S
2
max
δ
t+1
1
∈∆S
1
Q
∗
t+1(σ
t+1
, 〈δt+11 , δ
t+1
2 〉). (23)
We formally prove that the statistic σt provides sufficient information
for rational decision-making in the zs-POSG.
Lemma 2. σt is a sufficient statistic for the value of the zs-POSG, i.e.
Q∗t (σ
t, ~θt, δt) = Q∗t (ϕ
t, ~θt, δt),∀t ∈ 0 . . . h− 1, ∀~θt ∈ ~Θt,∀δt.
Proof. The proof is listed in Appendix A.
This allows us to define the value function of the zs-POSG in terms
of the sufficient statistic as follows:
V
∗
t (σ
t) , max
δt
1
∈∆S
1
min
δt
2
∈∆S
2
Q
∗
t (σ
t
, 〈δt1, δ
t
2〉). (24)
Although we have now identified the value at a single stage of the
game, implementing a backwards inductive approach directly is still
not possible, since the space of statistics is continuous and we do
not know how to represent V ∗t (σt). This paper takes a first step at
resolving this problem by investigating the structure of V ∗t (σt).
4.3 Equivalence Final Stage Zero-Sum POSG and
Family of Zero-Sum Bayesian Games
We have already proven that the value function of a Family of zero-
sum Bayesian Games exhibits concavity and convexity in terms of
the marginal parts of the type distribution σ for respectively agent 1
and 2. We show that the final stage of the zs-POSG P , t = h − 1,
can be defined as a Family of zs-BGs as follows:
• I = {1, 2} is the set of agents,
• Θ = ~Θh−1 is the set of joint types corresponding to AOHs in
zs-POSG P at stage h− 1,
• A is the set of joint actions in zs-POSG P ,
• R(~θh−1, a) follows directly from the immediate reward function
of P (as described in Section 4.1).
By the result of Theorem 1 (i.e., that V ∗F exhibits concavity and con-
vexity in marginal-spaces of agent 1 and 2 respectively) the value
function at the final stage of the zs-POSG, V ∗h−1, is concave in
∆(~Θh−11 ) for all σh−1c,1 , and convex in ∆(~Θh−12 ) for all σh−1c,2 .
Note that, even though the final stage is equal to a Family of
Bayesian Games, our approach is substantially different from ap-
proaches that represent a POSG as a series of BGs [4] and derivative
works [17]. In fact, all other stages (0 to h − 2) cannot be repre-
sented as a Family of BGs, as the rational value function for stages
t = 0, ..., h− 2 cannot be expressed as a function R(~θt, a).
4.4 Concavity/Convexity of the Value Function
We continue to show that the value function for any stage exhibits the
same type of structure. In particular, the plan-time sufficient statis-
tic can be decomposed in marginals and conditionals, and the value
function is concave in marginal-space for agent 1, ∆(~Θt1), and con-
vex in marginal-space for agent 2, ∆(~Θt2). Figure 1 provides intu-
ition on how the best-response value functions relate to the con-
cave/convex value function: a ‘slice’ in statistic-space corresponds to
a single conditional σtc,1 (σtc,2) and exhibits concave (convex) shape
of the value function made up by linear segments that each corre-
spond to a partial policy of the other agent. As we will show, each
segment corresponds exactly to a best-response value function.
Best-response value functions in terms of σt and πti are defined
as V BR1t and V BR2t , similar to (6) and (7). Let Πti be the space of all
stochastic partial policies πti . We then have:
V
∗
t (σ
t) = min
πt
2
∈Πt
2
V
BR1
t (σ
t
, π
t
2) = max
πt
1
∈Πt
1
V
BR2
t (σ
t
, π
t
1). (25)
We first show that the best-response value functions V BR1t and
V BR2t are linear in their respective marginal-spaces. Let us define a
vector that contains the value (immediate reward and future value)
σt-space
σtc,1-space σ
t
m,1-space
Vt V
BR1
t (σ
t, pit2)
σ
t
-space
σ
t
m,2-space σ
t
c,2-space
Vt
V
BR2
t (σ
t
, pi
t
1)
Figure 1: An abstract visualization of the decomposition of statistic-space
into marginal-space and conditional-space.
for agent 1 for each individual AOH ~θt1, given that agent 2 follows
the partial policy πt2:
~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
](~θ
t
1) , max
at
1
∈A1
[ ∑
~θt
2
∈~Θt
2
σ
t
c,1(~θ
t
2|~θ
t
1)
∑
at
2
∈A2
δ
t
2(a
t
2|~θ
t
2)
(
R(~θt, at) +
∑
ot+1∈O1
Pr(ot+1|~θt, at)~ν
[σt+1
c,1
,π
t+1
2
]
(~θt+11 )
)]
(26)
Note that this is a recursive definition, and that ~θt+11 =
〈~θt1, a
t
1, o
t+1
1 〉. The vector ~ν[σtc,2,πt1] is defined analogously.
Lemma 3. (1) V BR1t is linear in ∆(~Θt1) for a given σtc,1 and πt2, and
(2) V BR2t is linear in ∆(~Θt2) for a given σtc,2 and πt1, for all stages
t = 0, . . . , h− 1:
1. V BR1t (σtm,1σtc,1, πt2) = ~σtm,1 · ~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
], (27)
2. V BR2t (σtm,2σtc,2, πt1) = ~σtm,2 · ~ν[σt
c,2
,πt
1
]. (28)
Proof. We prove this by induction. We know the zs-POSG value
function at stage t = h − 1 to be equivalent to that of a Family
of zs-BGs, which is concave/convex (Lemma 1). This is a base case
for the proof. The full proof is listed in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. V ∗t is (1) concave in ∆(~Θt1) for a given σtc,1, and (2)
convex in ∆(~Θt2) for a given σtc,2. More specifically, V ∗t is respec-
tively a minimization over linear functions in ∆(~Θt1) and a maxi-
mization over linear functions in ∆(~Θt2):
1. V ∗t (σtm,1σtc,1) = min
πt
2
∈Πt
2
[
~σtm,1 · ~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
]
]
,
2. V ∗t (σtm,2σtc,2) = max
πt
1
∈Πt
1
[
~σtm,2 · ~ν[σt
c,2
,πt
1
]
]
.
Proof. Filling in the result of Lemma 3 gives:
V
∗
t (σ
t
m,1σ
t
c,1)
{25}
= min
πt
2
∈Πt
2
V
BR1
t (σ
t
m,1σ
t
c,1, π
t
2)
{27}
= min
πt
2
∈Πt
2
[
~σ
t
m,1 · ~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
]
]
.
The proof for item 2 is analogous to that of item 1.
The importance of this theorem is that it suggests ways to (ap-
proximately) represent V ∗t (σt). Thus, it may enable the development
of new solution methods for zs-POSGs. To draw the parallel, many
POMDP solution methods exploit the fact that a POMDP value func-
tion is piecewise-linear and convex (PWLC) in belief-space [20, 27]
(which is similar to the statistic-space we consider), and recently
such results have been extended to the decentralized cooperative (i.e.,
Dec-POMDP) case [3, 10].
Note that our result is similar to, but different from the saddle-
point function that is typically associated with min-max equilibria.
In particular, the value function in is defined in the space of plan-
time sufficient statistics, while the well-known saddle point function
(see Section 2.1) is a function of complete strategies. This means
that the latter is only defined for the reduction to a normal form game,
which per definition destroys any of the specific structure of the game
under concern. In contrast, our formulation preserves such structure
and thus allows us to make statements about how value generalizes
as a function of the information distribution. That is, the formulation
allows us to give approximation bounds that generalize within each
conditional statistic.
5 Reduction to NOSG
The application of methods that exploit the PWLC structure of
the value function of Dec-POMDPs was enabled by a reduction
from Dec-POMDP to a non-observable MDP (NOMDP), which is
a special type of (centralized) POMDP [3, 10, 14, 16]. This allows
POMDP solution methods to be employed in the context of Dec-
POMDPs. The proposed plan-time statistics for Dec-POMDPs [15]
precisely correspond to the belief in the centralized model.
Since we have shown that it is possible to generalize the plan-
time statistics to the zs-POSG case, it is reasonable to expect that zs-
POSGs can be reduced similarly. Here we present a reduction from
zs-POSG to a special type of stochastic game where information is
centralized, to which we refer as a Non-Observable Stochastic Game
(NOSG). We do not provide the full background of the reduction
for the Dec-POMDP case, but refer to [16]. The difference between
the reduction from Dec-POMDP to NOMDP and the one we present
next, is that the zs-POSG is reduced to a stochastic game where the
joint AOH acts as the state.
Definition 8. A plan-time Non-Observable Stochastic Game for
a zs-POSG is a tuple 〈S˙, A˙1, A˙1, O˙, T˙, O˙, R˙, b˙0〉:
• I = {1, 2} is the set of agents,
• S˙ is the set of augmented states s˙t, each corresponding to a joint
AOH ~θt,
• A˙ = A˙1×A˙2 is the continuous action-space, containing stochas-
tic decision rules δt = 〈δt1, δt2〉,
• O˙ = {NULL} is set of joint observations that only contains the
NULL observation.
• T˙ is the transition function that specifies T˙ (s˙t+1 | s˙t, 〈a˙t1, a˙t2〉) =
Pr(~θt+1 | ~θt, 〈δt1, δt2〉).
• O˙ is the observation function that specifies that observation NULL
is received with probability 1.
• R˙ : S˙ ×A → R is the reward function R(~θt, 〈δt1, δt2〉),
• b˙0 ∈ ∆(S˙) is the initial belief over states.
In the NOSG model, agents condition their choices on the joint
belief over augmented states b˙ ∈ ∆(S˙), which corresponds to the
belief over joint AOHs captured in the statistic σt ∈ ∆(Θt). As
such, a value function formulation for the NOSG can be given in
accordance with (24).
In order to avoid potential confusion, let us point out that a zs-
POSG can also be converted to a best response POMDP by fixing
the policies of one agent [12], which leads to a model where the
information state b(s, θj) is a distribution over states and AOHs of
the other agent. In contrast, our NOSG formulation maintains a belief
over only joint AOHs. More importantly, however, our approach does
not require fixing the policy of any agent, which would necessitate
recomputing of all values when the fixed policy changes (if the past
policy changes, the distributions over paths change, and thus future
values are affected). Where the approach of Nair et al. [12] leads to a
single-agent model that can be used to compute a best-response, our
conversion leads to a multi-agent model that can be used to compute
a Nash equilibrium directly.
A key contribution of our NOSG formulation is that it directly
indicates that properties of ‘zero-sum stochastic games with shared
observations’ [5] also hold for zs-POSGs.
Definition 9. A zero-sum Shared Observation Stochastic Game
(zs-SOSG) is a zs-POSG (cf. Def. 5) in which each agent receives
the joint observation and can observe the other’s actions.
Ghosh et al. [5] show that, under some technical assumptions, a zs-
SOSG can be converted into a completely observable model (similar
to the conversion of a POMDP into a belief MDP), and that, in the
infinite-horizon case, both the value and a rational joint policy exists.
Our claim is that these results in fact transfer to the more general
class of zs-POSGs via our NOSG construction. We start by noting:
Lemma 4. The plan-time NOSG of a finite-horizon zs-POSG is a
zs-SOSG.
Proof. In the finite-horizon case, the set of states in our plan-time
NOSG is discrete. The action space, while continuous, is of finite di-
mensionality, and is a closed and bounded set. The set of shared ob-
servations only consists of a trivial NULL observation and by assum-
ing rationality for both players, we can assume that they observe each
others actions (corresponding to decision rules of the POSG).
In the infinite-horizon case, some assumptions on the class of deci-
sion rules δti are needed to be able to formulate the plan-time NOSG
model and assuming infinite policy trees as the policies would vi-
olate certain technical requirements on which Ghosh’s results de-
pend (e.g., the action-spaces are required to be metric and compact
spaces). However, a straightforward extension of our reduction for
the case where the agents use finite-state controllers (analogous to
such formulations for Dec-POMDPs [10]), would satisfy these re-
quirements, and as such we can infer the existence of a value for
such games:
Corollary 1. For infinite-horizon zs-POSGs where agents are re-
stricted to use finite-state controllers for their policies, the value of
the game exists.
In that way, our reduction shows that some of the properties estab-
lished by Ghosh et al. for a limited subset of zero-sum stochastic
games, in fact extend to a much broader class of problems.
6 Related Work
There is rich body of literature on zero-sum games, and we provide
pointers to the most relevant works here. The concave and convex
structure we have found for the zs-POSG value function is similar
to the saddle point structure associated with min-max equilibria [1].
Note, however, that we have defined the value function in terms of
the distribution over information, rather than the substantially differ-
ent space of joint strategies, solving of which requires flattening the
game to normal form. That is, our results tell us something about
the value of acting using the current information, thus they may give
insight into games of general partial observability.
A recent paper that is similar in spirit to ours is by Nayyar et al.
[13] who introduce a so-called Common Information Based Con-
ditional Belief — a probability distribution over AOHs and the
state conditioned on common information — and use it to design
a dynamic-programming approach for zs-POSGs. This method con-
verts stages of the zs-POSG to Bayesian Games for which the type
distribution corresponds to the statistic at that stage. However, since
their proposed statistic is a distribution over joint AOHs and states,
the statistic we propose in this paper is more compact. More impor-
tantly, Nayyar et al. do not provide any results regarding the structure
of the value function, which is the main contribution of our paper.
Hansen et al. [7] present a dynamic-programming approach for
finite-horizon (general sum) POSGs that iteratively constructs sets of
one-step-longer (pure) policies for all agents. At every iteration, the
sets of individual policies are pruned by removing dominated poli-
cies. This pruning is based on a different statistic called multi-agent
belief : a distribution over states and policies of other agents. Such a
multi-agent belief is sufficient from the perspective of an individual
agent to determine its best response (or whether some of its poli-
cies are dominated). A more generalized investigation of individual
statistics in decentralized settings is given by Wu & Lall [28]. How-
ever, these notions are not a sufficient statistic for the past joint policy
from a designer perspective (as is the proposed plan-time sufficient
statistic in this paper). In fact, they are complementary and we hy-
pothesize that they can be fruitfully combined in future work.
There are works from game theory literature that present structural
results on the value function of so-called ‘repeated zero-sum games
with incomplete information’ [11, 21, 22, 23]. These can best be un-
derstood as a class of two-player extensive form games that lie in
between Bayesian games and POSGs: at the start of the game, nature
determines the state (a joint type) from which each agent makes a pri-
vate observation (i.e., individual type), and subsequently the agents
take actions in turns, thereby observing the actions of the opponent.
The models for which these results have been proven are therefore
substantially less general than the zs-POSG model we consider.
For various flavors of such games, it has been shown that the value
function has a concave/convex structure: cases with incomplete infor-
mation on one side [23, 26], and cases with incomplete information
on both sides where ‘observations are independent’ (i.e., where the
distribution over joint types is a product of individual type distribu-
tions) [21] or dependent (general joint type distributions) [11, 22].
These results, however, crucially depend on the alternating actions
and the static state and therefore do not extend to zs-POSGs.
A game-theoretic model that is closely related to the POSG model
is the Interactive POMDP or I-POMDP [6]. In I-POMDPs, a (sub-
jective) belief bi(s, ζj) is constructed from the perspective of a sin-
gle agent as a probability distribution over states and the types, ζj ,
of the other agent. A level-k I-POMDP agent i reasons about level-
(k − 1) types ζj . Since each ζj fully determines the future policy of
the other agent j, an I-POMDP can be interpreted as a best-response
POMDP similar to the one introduced by Nair et al. [12] (discussed
in Section 5), with the difference that the state also represents which
policy the other agent uses. The differences mentioned in Section 5
also apply here; where an I-POMDP can be used to compute a best-
response, our formulation is aimed at computing a Nash equilibrium.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents a structural result on the shape of the value
function of two-player zero-sum games of incomplete information,
for games of static state and dynamic state, typically modeled as
a Bayesian Game (BG) and Partially Observable Stochastic Game
(POSG) respectively. We formally defined the value function for both
types of games in terms of an information distribution called the suf-
ficient plan-time statistic: a probability distribution over joint sets
of private information (originally used in the collaborative setting
[15]). Using the fact that this probability distribution can be decom-
posed into a marginal and a conditional term, we presented that in the
zero-sum case value functions of both types of games exhibit concav-
ity (convexity) in the space of marginal statistics of the maximizing
(minimizing) agent, for every conditional statistic. In the multi-stage
game, this structure of the value function is preserved on every stage.
Thus, our formulation enables us to make statements about how value
generalizes as a function of the information distribution. Lastly, we
showed how the results allow us to reduce our zs-POSG to a model
with shared observations, thereby transferring properties of this nar-
rower class of games to the zs-POSG.
We hope that this result leads to solution methods that exploit the
structure of the value function at every stage, as recently such devel-
opments have been made in the field of cooperative multi-agent prob-
lems [10]. In particular, we believe that heuristic methods that iden-
tify useful (conditional) statistics to explore, or point-based methods
that iteratively select statistics to evaluate [10, 27] may be adapted
for the zs-POSG case.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We will prove item 1:
V
BR1
F (σm,1σc,1, δ2) = ~σm,1 · ~r[σc,1,δ2]
The Q-value definition is expanded in order to bring the marginal
term σm,1 to the front of the equation:
QF(σ, δ)
{1,3}
=
∑
θ∈Θ
σ(θ)
∑
a∈A
δ(a|θ)R(θ, a)
=
∑
θ1∈Θ1
σm,1(θ1)
∑
θ2∈Θ2
σc,1(θ2|θ1)
∑
a1∈A1
δ1(a1|θ1)
∑
a2∈A2
δ2(a2|θ2)R(〈θ1, θ2〉, 〈a1, a2〉). (A.29)
A maximization over stochastic decision rules conditioned on θ1 is
equivalent to choosing a maximizing action for each θ1. Thus, we
can rewrite the best-response value function as follows:
V
BR1
F (σ, δ2) = max
δ1∈∆
S
1
Q
R
t (σ, 〈δ1, δ2〉)
{A.29}
= max
δ1∈∆
S
1
[ ∑
θ1∈Θ1
σm,1(θ1)
∑
θ2∈Θ2
σc,1(θ2|θ1)
∑
a1∈A1
δ1(a1|θ1)
∑
a2∈A2
δ2(a2|θ2)R(〈θ1, θ2〉, 〈a1, a2〉)
]
=
∑
θ1∈Θ1
σm,1(θ1)max
a1
[ ∑
θ2∈Θ2
σc,1(θ2|θ1)
∑
a2∈A2
δ2(a2|θ2)R(θ, a)
]
{9}
=
∑
θ1∈Θ1
σm,1(θ1)~r[σc,1,δ2](θ1)
{vec. not.}
= ~σm,1 · ~r[σc,1,δ2].
As it is possible to write V BR1F as an inner product of two vectors,
V BR1F is linear in ∆(Θ1) for all σc,1 and δ2. Analogously, V BR2F is
linear in ∆(Θ2) for all σc,2 and δ1.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is largely identical to the proof of cor-
rectness of sufficient statistics in the collaborative setting [15]. For
the final stage t = h − 1, we have the following: Q∗t (ϕt, ~θt, δt) =
R(~θt, δt) = Q∗t (σ
t, ~θt, δt). As induction hypothesis, we assume
that at stage t+ 1, σt+1 is a sufficient statistic, i.e.:
Q
∗
t+1(ϕ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, δ
t+1
pp ) = Q
∗
t+1(σ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, δ
t+1
ss ). (A.30)
We aim to show that at stage t, σt is a sufficient statistic:
Q
∗
t (ϕ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t
pp) = Q
∗
t (σ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t
ss). (A.31)
We substitute the induction hypothesis into (21):
Q
∗
t (ϕ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t
pp)
{21}
= R(~θt, δtpp) +
∑
at∈A
∑
ot+1
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, δtpp)
Q
∗
t+1(ϕ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, δ
t+1∗
pp )
{A.30}
= R(~θt, δtss) +
∑
at∈A
∑
ot+1
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, δtss)
Q
∗
t+1(σ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, δ
t+1∗
ss ) = Q
∗
t (σ
t
, ~θ
t
, δ
t
ss).
Furthermore, decision rules δt+1∗1,pp (based on the past joint policy)
and δt+1∗1,ss (based on the sufficient statistic) are equal:
δ
t+1∗
1,pp
{(22)}
= argmax
δ
t+1
1
∈∆S
1
min
δ
t+1
2
∈∆S
2
[ ∑
~θt+1∈~Θt+1
Pr(~θt+1|b0, ϕt+1)
Q
∗
t+1(ϕ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, 〈δt+11 , δ
t+1
2 〉)
]
{(7)}
= argmax
δ
t+1
1
∈∆S
1
min
δ
t+1
2
∈∆S
2
[ ∑
~θt+1∈~Θt+1
σ
t+1(~θt+1)
Q
∗
t+1(σ
t+1
, ~θ
t+1
, 〈δt+11 , δ
t+1
2 〉)
]
{22}
= δt+1∗1,ss .
Analogous reasoning holds for δt+1∗2,ss . Thus, by induction, σt is a
sufficient statistic for ϕt, ∀t ∈ 0 . . . h− 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. By the results of Lemma 1 and the results from
Section 4.3, we know the best-response value function V BR1h−1 to be
linear in ∆(~Θh−11 ). For all other stages, we assume the following
induction hypothesis:
V
BR1
t+1 (σ
t+1
m,1σ
t+1
c,1 , π
t+1
2 ) = σ
t+1
m,1 · ~ν[σt+1
c,1
,π
t+1
2
]
. (A.32)
For the inductive step we aim to prove that at the current stage t the
following holds:
V
BR1
t (σ
t
m,1σ
t
c,1, π
t
2) = ~σ
t
m,1 · ~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
]. (A.33)
Let QRt be a function similar to (3) that defines reward for a given
statistic and joint decision rule. We expand the definition of V BR1t .
For notational convenience we write σt instead of σtm,iσtc,i, but keep
in mind that we consider statistics corresponding to conditional σtc,i.
V
BR1
t (σ
t
, π
t
2)
{25}
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BR1
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]
.(A.34)
Here, Uss is the statistic update rule, defined in accordance with (18).
We make the decomposition of σt into the marginal and conditional
terms explicit again. Immediate reward QRt can be expanded similar
to (A.29):
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We expand V BR1t+1 using the induction hypothesis in order to bring the
marginal distribution σtm,1 to the front:
V
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Filling the expanded equations into (A.34) and factorizing gives:
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. (A.37)
Note that the vector is indexed by the conditional σt+1c,1 . While this
conditional is dependent on δt2, it is not dependent on δt1, allowing
us to remove the maximization over decision rules δt1 from the equa-
tion. As a maximization over decision rules conditioned on individ-
ual AOH ~θt1 is equal to choosing the maximizing action for each of
these AOHs, we can rewrite (A.37) as follows:
V
BR1
t (σ
t
, π
t
2)
=
∑
~θt
1
∈~Θt
1
σ
t
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t
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1
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~θt∈~Θt
2
σ
t
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t
2|~θ
t
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∑
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1
∈A2
δ
t
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t
2|~θ
t
2)
(
R(~θt, at) +
∑
oFt+1∈O
Pr(ot+1|~θt, at)~ν
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,π
t+1
2
]
(~θt+11 )
)]
{26}
=
∑
~θt
1
∈~Θt
1
σ
t
m,1(~θ
t
1)~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
](~θ
t
1)
{vec. not.}
= ~σtm,1 · ~ν[σt
c,1
,πt
2
]. (A.38)
This corresponds to (A.33). Therefore, by induction, best-response
value function V BR1t is linear in ∆(~Θt1) for a given σtc,1 and πt2, for
all stages t = 0 . . . h − 1. Analogously, V BR2t is a linear function in
∆(~Θt2) for a given σtc,2 and πt1, for all stages t = 0 . . . h− 1.
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